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Earthquake Prediction in Occupied Japan 
Kerry Smith∗ 
Abstract: »Erdbebenvorhersage im Japan der Okkupationszeit«. In the span of 
the first few years after Japan’s defeat in World War II, five of Japan’s leading 
earth scientists came forward to warn the nation that major earthquakes would 
soon occur. They (almost) never did. This article focuses on those predictions to 
highlight the debates that shaped early postwar efforts in Japan to make scien-
tists, and earth scientists in particular, guardians of the public’s safety. It draws 
on multiple archival collections, participant accounts and popular media cover-
age to explore the tensions between individual scientists and newly formed, 
officially sanctioned bodies charged with coordinating earthquake prediction 
research. These tensions, I argue, reflect both a long-standing ambivalence 
within the field toward prediction’s legitimacy, and the emergence of a new set 
of research and policy imperatives for Japan’s earth scientists that privileged it. 
The legacies of the Occupation-era encounters with prediction include the 
1962 publication of Earthquake Prediction: Current Status and a Plan for De-
velopment, the formation of the Coordinating Committee for Earthquake Pre-
diction in 1969 and the passage of the Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeas-
ures Act in 1978. 
Keywords: Imamura Akitsune, Sassa Kenzō, Tsuboi Chūji, Wadati Kiyoo, Beno 
Gutenberg, Great Kantō Earthquake 1923, hazard mitigation, political history. 
1.  Introduction 
In the span of the first few years after Japan’s defeat in World War II, five of 
Japan’s leading earth scientists came forward on separate occasions, and impli-
cating six different locations, to warn the nation that major earthquakes would 
soon occur. They (almost) never did. This article focuses on those predictions 
to highlight the debates that shaped early postwar efforts to make scientists, 
and earth scientists in particular, guardians of the public’s safety. 
The significance that scientists, policy makers, and the public have assigned 
to earthquake prediction in modern Japan, whether as a legitimate research 
topic or as a reasonable investment in mitigating against hazards the future was 
sure to bring, has varied widely. We are arguably at one end of a long arc that 
began more than a century ago, when John Milne, Sekiya Seikei and others laid 
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modern seismology’s foundations in Japan and established prediction as one of 
its goals. The pursuit of the sort of timely, specific warnings they had imagined 
may be nearing its end. As models of how and why earthquakes happen have 
become more sophisticated, they have suggested that the pathways leading to 
seismic events may be complicated beyond the limits of successful prediction. 
Better instrumentation or more careful measuring protocols will not matter, if 
these analyses are correct. With a few possible exceptions, and barring para-
digmatic shifts in technology or modeling, many scientists are convinced that 
research into deterministic earthquake prediction has reached a dead end. Such 
conclusions, and the realization that massive investments of expertise and 
money towards the pursuit of earthquake prediction in Japan have yielded no 
success stories – the 1995 Kobe earthquake and the March 2011 earthquake 
and tsunami struck without the sort of warning the nation’s prediction appa-
ratus was created to provide – have already produced one set of narratives 
about prediction’s recent history that is quite cynical about the motives and 
practices of the scientists associated with it (Shimamura 2004; Shimamura 
2008; Geller 2011). Those narratives are in tension with an older and larger 
body of work that relates the history of earthquake prediction in much more 
positive terms, as one of institutions and researchers committed to protecting 
the nation from harm. While these histories do acknowledge that prediction has 
remained elusive in practice, they describe the pursuit of that goal as a rational, 
scientific campaign to address a problem that would in time be solved. Even as 
estimates of how long it would be before prediction was reliable and accurate 
were pushed further and further into the future, the image of seismologists 
working at the cutting edge of technological innovation for the good of the 
nation, and as having devised the best possible strategies for preparing the 
country for the worst, were widely shared. In the late 1970s, government sur-
veys revealed that roughly 60 percent of those asked believed that earthquakes 
could already be predicted; more than a quarter expected prediction to become 
absolutely possible within ten years (Naikakufu seifu kōhōshitsu 1978). 
One of this article’s goals is to answer straightforward questions about the 
timing and the science behind the flurry of earthquake predictions that followed 
the end of the war. Why were so many made in such a short period of time? 
Public warnings from Japanese earth scientists about increased short-term risk 
from earthquakes had up to that point been rare events. Even Imamura 
Akitsune, who was perhaps early twentieth century Japan’s most prolific pre-
dictor of earthquakes, was responsible for only a handful of such warnings over 
the course of his entire career. For many years he was really the only scientist 
with standing in the field who made such claims in public. Although Imamura 
was among those who contributed to the postwar surge of warnings, the four 
other scientists who did so were newcomers to prediction. What explains pre-
diction’s sudden, simultaneous prominence in their work? 
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It also makes sense to ask what happened to prediction as a set of scientific 
practices and ideas after 1949. After Nakamura Saemontarō’s attempts that 
year to warn the residents of Niigata of an impending earthquake, Japan’s earth 
scientists seem to have abandoned earthquake prediction – at least as a set of 
public practices – just as abruptly as it had once been embraced. Why? Given 
that the methods and data the scientists had based their warnings on were so 
varied, it seems unlikely that a single failed forecast or discredited model could 
account for the collective turning away from acts of prediction that happened 
after 1949. Those scientists who had issued public warnings – Kyoto Universi-
ty’s Sassa Kenzō among them – appear to have suffered no lasting damage to 
their reputations as a result of their actions. In the early 1960s, when prediction 
once again became a highly visible part of the work that Japanese seismologists 
did for the nation, the leaders of that initiative included many of the same men 
who had played public roles in the debates of the 1940s. Asked another way, 
why was prediction set aside in the late 1940s, only to be enthusiastically em-
braced by the field a decade or so later? 
Answering those questions also brings into focus some of the tensions that 
have shaped how science and society have interacted around the management 
of risk and natural hazards in Japan, and arguably elsewhere (Hough 2010; Fan 
2012; Clancey 2012). The series of Occupation-era warnings discussed below 
were both specific to particular locales and time frames and part of larger, 
increasingly visible discourses about the importance of science to postwar 
Japan’s future. Shaped in part by the perception that the Allies’ victory over 
Japan owed a great deal to their investment and faith in science and technology, 
the idea that both should play prominent roles in Japan’s efforts to rebuild was 
widely shared. At the same time, and as the confusion that accompanied the 
earthquake warnings of the 1940s highlights, there was little consensus within 
the scientific community about how or when to communicate ideas and con-
cerns to the public or to policy makers. Early state-led efforts to support earth-
quake prediction research masked significant divisions among the key actors 
over what constituted a valid prediction, for example, and over their responsi-
bilities to share what they knew. As will be seen below, negotiations over fund-
ing, institutional rivalries and the legacies of past earthquake warnings played 
important roles in shaping Japan’s postwar turn to prediction. Focusing on this 
admittedly unusual episode does useful work both by challenging histories built 
around prediction’s seemingly inevitable emergence as the flagship of the 
nation’s defenses against earthquakes, and by drawing attention to how predic-
tion’s past remains relevant. 
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2.  Post-Surrender Japan: Some Context 
The Allied Occupation of Japan lasted from shortly after the Empire’s surren-
der in August 1945 until April 1952. Very few of the nation’s institutions were 
left unchanged by the reforms and legislative initiatives launched during that 
period (although many of these changes were the result of processes already 
underway well before the Americans arrived) (Dower 1999). While the Emper-
or, the military, and democratization in general were the most visible targets of 
Occupation-era reforms, the structures and practices of Japan’s scientific com-
munity also came under careful if somewhat episodic scrutiny. The histories of 
the Earthquake Research Institute at the University of Tokyo and of many of 
the earth scientists who shaped seismology in postwar Japan suggest as much. 
One way to think about earthquake prediction’s emergence as a social and 
scientific problem is as one of many instances during the Occupation in which 
Japanese actors – mostly seismologists – and Occupation officials were caught 
up in multi-layered negotiations over research agendas, resources, and occa-
sionally, ideologies. While this study is interested both in earthquake prediction 
as a phenomenon of the Occupation and in its trajectory across multiple eras in 
Japan’s modern history, the context of the discussions and debates about pre-
diction in 1947 and 1948 (and beyond) clearly matter a great deal. 
For one thing, both the key actors in the debates over postwar earthquake 
prediction and their access to the public had changed significantly since the last 
time these issues had attracted much public attention, which had been in the 
mid-1920s. The most visible earth scientists in postwar prediction – Sassa 
Kenzō, Tsuboi Chūji, and Wadati Kiyoo among them – were relatively young 
members of an emergent second generation of leaders in the field. None had 
been directly involved in the field’s earlier encounters with prediction, all were 
well-established in their careers, and all but Sassa had done their graduate 
training at Tokyo Imperial University. 
Much as the actors had changed, so too had the channels through which in-
formation and arguments about prediction travelled. Postwar mass media of-
fered many more pathways through which interested readers could be reached 
than had been the case in pre-surrender Japan. Occupation-era reforms had 
freed the press from many of the constraints that had limited its ability to chal-
lenge officialdom or to report unpleasant or potentially disruptive news, re-
strictions that had become increasingly harsh during the war, and had promoted 
the idea that one of journalism’s new responsibilities was to serve the public, 
not the Japanese state. While there were many exceptions to these rules, espe-
cially where the actions of the Americans themselves were concerned (Ameri-
can censorship of the press was widespread and often arbitrary) Japanese 
newspapers and journals exercised very little apparent restraint when it came to 
coverage of earthquake prediction in the late 1940s. The postwar boom in the 
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publication of popular magazines devoted to science is further evidence that 
new channels for communication found an eager audience. 
The Americans were themselves one of the audiences for coverage of earth-
quake prediction, both via translations of Japanese-language newspaper articles 
that appeared in Stars and Stripes and other English-language publications, and 
officially in the context of conversations with seismologists and reports on their 
activities. Most of the official American interest in earthquake prediction origi-
nated with staff in the Natural Resources Section of the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers (SCAP) bureaucracy. Officers of the 43rd Weather Wing 
were also part of the conversations about prediction because of their involve-
ment with the operations and long-term plans of the Central Meteorological 
Observatory. The reasons for the Americans’ interest were in part structural, 
reflecting SCAP’s mission to re-organize every aspect of Japanese science, and 
in part scientific. If Japanese scientists had found a way to predict earthquakes, 
the Americans wanted access to that knowledge. 
Having the Americans involved meant several things for Japanese seismolo-
gists. First, the Americans held almost all of the cards that mattered when it 
came to decisions about how best to reorganize Japanese universities and re-
search programs more generally. Many of those processes were still taking 
shape in 1947 and 1948, the height of the first postwar earthquake prediction 
“boom.” Over the course of the summer of 1947, the Earthquake Research 
Institute (ERI), the Central Meteorological Observatory (CMO) and several 
other agencies and offices involved in the earth sciences were subject to thor-
ough, critical reviews at the hands of SCAP bureaucrats. Caltech’s Beno Gu-
tenberg was brought to Japan by the Americans in mid-1947 to consult on the 
review. Gutenberg’s recommendations formed the basis for proposals that later 
sought to re-define the core mission and responsibilities of the various earth 
sciences agencies. The Americans were particularly concerned about what 
many of them saw as significant overstaffing and inefficiencies within the earth 
sciences infrastructure. Because one of SCAP’s overarching goals at this point 
in the Occupation was to reign in Japanese government spending (as part of its 
ongoing effort to stabilize the postwar economy), it was no secret that the 
Americans were looking for ways to cut budgets and jobs where they could. 
From the perspective of the scientists and technicians employed at the ERI 
or CMO, American scrutiny brought with it considerable risk and uncertainty. 
The risks were personal as much as institutional. In those first few years after 
surrender, the consequences of losing one’s job – even ones as poorly compen-
sated as most research positions surely were – would likely have been devastat-
ing. Those involved in the negotiations with the Americans over the fate of the 
Institute and the Observatory would have been well aware of what was at stake, 
just as they knew too that at some level they were in competition with each 
other for scarce resources. The tensions between the ERI and CMO went back 
many years and had in fact resulted in not a little duplication of effort. They ran 
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separate instrumentation networks, seldom shared data, and collaborated rarely, 
all practices of which the Americans were well aware. 
Finally, it was also true that the Americans could be sources of legitimization, 
and could promote research agendas of which they approved. One of Beno Gu-
tenberg’s contributions to the review of Japanese earth sciences was to speak on 
behalf of his Japanese colleagues, to vouch for their skill and professional stand-
ing, and to argue for their continued access to the resources necessary for their 
work. His comments on earthquake prediction too carried some weight, and 
almost certainly influenced the Americans’ decision to provide at least limited 
support for research and coordination in that area, beginning soon after Guten-
berg’s departure from Japan. It is to developments in the summer of 1947, and to 
the first postwar debates over earthquake prediction, that we now turn. 
3.  The Nankaidō Earthquake and Beno Gutenberg in 
Tokyo 
On 20 December 1946, a massive earthquake with an epicenter offshore of the 
Kii peninsula destroyed almost 40,000 homes in southeastern Japan, and left 
more than 1,000 of the region’s residents dead or missing. The Nankaidō 
Earthquake came two years after the equally deadly December 1944 Tōnankai 
quake, which like the 1946 event involved a rupture of what were thought to be 
coupled segments running southwest to northeast along the Nankai Trough 
(Yamashita 2009). The Nankaidō earthquake was the first major seismic event 
of the Occupation.  
News that Imamura Akitsune had predicted the Nankaidō earthquake sur-
faced in its wake. Imamura’s long and storied career as a seismologist began in 
the late nineteenth century, when he was among the first Japanese trained in the 
field. His reputation, and the arc of his career, took shape around two episodes, 
both relevant to his role in postwar earthquake prediction. Very briefly, the first 
involved the publication in 1905 of an article by Imamura in which he warned 
readers that Tokyo was at risk of a catastrophic, major earthquake in the rela-
tively near future. The point of that warning was in part to encourage residents 
and policy makers to take precautions and to think carefully about what an 
earthquake might do to a city as densely inhabited and as fire prone as Tokyo 
(Imamura 1905). Not long after the article went into print, Tokyo experienced a 
series of relatively minor, but noticeable earthquakes. The public’s frightened 
reaction to these tremors – said to be fueled by the re-telling in various forms 
of Imamura’s warning – was unusual in its intensity and persistence. In an 
effort to calm the city’s nerves, Ōmori Fusakichi, Tokyo Imperial University’s 
sole Professor of Seismology and Imamura’s direct superior, published a 
lengthy article of his own in March 1906. The Groundless Rumor of a Great 
Tokyo Earthquake (Tokyo to daijishin no fusetsu) was clearly directed not just 
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at general misconceptions about earthquakes but at Imamura’s arguments and 
analysis in particular. Ōmori challenged Imamura’s handling of the historical 
statistics relating to earthquake frequency, ridiculing the idea that Tokyo was at 
risk in the near term. If Ōmori’s primary goal was to convince city residents to 
go about their daily lives and not to jump at every passing tremor, he seemed to 
be going out of his way to declare Imamura’s methods and basic premises as 
deeply flawed (Clancey 2006, 217-8; Hagiwara 1982, 52; Ōmori 1906). It was 
clear to Imamura and to those working in the field that Ōmori had delivered a 
very public and pointed denunciation of Imamura’s work. Imamura’s career 
and his standing in the field were left badly damaged. 
The second episode followed the 1 September 1923 Great Kantō Earthquake. 
That event left Tokyo and Yokohama in ruins, with large swaths of both cities 
burned to the ground by massive fires that began almost as soon as the first seis-
mic waves arrived. Parts of Tokyo remained aflame for days, as hundreds of 
thousands of suddenly homeless refugees sought shelter in city parks and open 
spaces, or fled the city altogether. The total number of dead and missing likely 
exceeded 120,000; the disappearance of entire families, neighborhoods and all 
the records associated with both makes a precise accounting impossible. 
In the aftermath of the earthquake, Imamura’s career and his reputation were 
at least partially rehabilitated. He embraced the opportunity the media was 
quick to offer him to remind the public of his earlier warnings, and to argue 
that his analyses and predictions had been shown to be accurate (Imamura 
1923, 17). From that point on and for the next several years, Imamura was 
Japanese seismology’s most prominent public figure. Promoted to fill the pro-
fessorship left vacant by Ōmori’s death (which happened not long after the 
earthquake), Imamura wrote regularly for mainstream and scientific journals, 
and seldom missed an opportunity to engage the press and the public. Imamu-
ra’s narratives and analyses of the Great Kantō earthquake shaped the public’s 
understanding of the event arguably more than any other single author. 
Imamura used his new position and status to argue for a major rehabilitation 
of Japanese seismology. His plan, which he drafted and ultimately lobbied hard 
for in Parliament, called for the development of an Earthquake Research Insti-
tute (Jishin kenkyūjo), based in Tokyo, with nine remote facilities for observa-
tion and data collection (four in the Kantō district, four in Kansai, and one in 
the Shinano region) (Imamura 1924; Hagiwara 1982, 272). The primary focus 
of this new institute, and the measuring networks under its control, would be 
the identification of earthquake precursors. Prediction would be at the center of 
seismology’s new research agenda. 
That proposal failed. The government did support the establishment of a 
new institute in the aftermath of the Great Kantō Earthquake, but instead of the 
ambitious hub-and-spoke arrangement Imamura had envisioned, one focused 
on the discovery and exploitation of signs of impending earthquakes, the 
Earthquake Research Institute inaugurated in 1925 on the campus of the Impe-
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rial Tokyo University had a much smaller organizational footprint, and a mis-
sion to promote fundamental research in earth science. Prediction, and other 
forms of “applied seismology,” were given low priority (Hagiwara 1982, 90). 
Despite these setbacks, Imamura remained one of the most visible spokes-
men for seismology and for science more generally long after the fate of the 
Earthquake Research Institute had been decided. He accepted an appointment 
in the new Institute, where he served until his retirement in 1930. In public 
venues he no longer advocated as strongly as he once had for prediction’s 
potential in Japan. In private, however, he continued the quest for clues that 
would reveal when and where an earthquake was about to occur. Using Imperi-
al Japanese Army cartographic and surveying data, for example, he looked for 
signs of tilting of the earth’s surface and for other indications of increased 
stress along faults, or within normally stable sectors. By the late 1920s he was 
certain that the Nankai district faced a very high risk of experiencing a major 
event. After retiring from the University, Imamura focused his data-collection 
activities there (Imamura 1933). 
Imamura’s history and media-savvy approach to finding an audience for his 
ideas helps explain his willingness to go public with his late 1946 earthquake 
warnings. A paper he presented at the Imperial Academy in Tokyo in mid-
October argued that “it is increasingly felt that the great earthquake just dis-
cussed [referring to a Nankai district event] will strike in the near future. This 
eventuality deserves the utmost attention from an academic standpoint as well 
as from the standpoint of disaster prevention.” (Usami 1982, 21) A few weeks 
prior to the 20 December earthquake he apparently warned local officials that 
signs of significant tilting and other surface changes evident in the area meant 
that they should prepare for the worst (Yamashita 2009, 133-5). 
The first Occupation-led inquiries into Imamura’s claim started in February. 
Late that month, SCAP summoned scientists from the Earthquake Research 
Institute and the Central Meteorological Observatory and asked them directly 
whether Imamura had predicted the December 1946 earthquake. The Ameri-
cans and the other Occupation officials involved in these discussions appear to 
have been skeptical of Imamura’s claims, but at the same time curious about 
Japanese seismology’s capabilities. If Imamura had found a way to predict 
earthquakes, they wanted to know about it (Jishin yochi renrakukai 1979, 13). 
Wadati Kiyoo, Hagiwara Takahiro and the other scientists invited to the 
meeting responded carefully to inquiries about what Imamura had done. Their 
colleague, they suggested, had been investigating the likelihood of a Nankai 
earthquake, but because he had not specified precisely when the event would 
occur, his warning was technically not a prediction, which required a clear 
statement of when and where the earthquake would strike, and how powerful it 
would be. That said, Hagiwara, Wadati and the others went on to argue that 
earthquake prediction was nevertheless worth pursuing. “It was revealed,” 
according to one summary of the meeting, “that earthquake prediction was 
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considered possible by conducting an extensive program for first order level-
ing, tiltmeter and tide gauge measurements, and study of earth current.”1 Per-
haps not surprisingly, that list is a very close approximation of the methods 
associated with Imamura’s efforts to predict the Nankai earthquake, which 
were said to have involved the study of “migration of active centers in seismic 
zone along Japanese coast; analysis of mean sea level variation, and extensive 
first order leveling program; historical observation of frequency of occurrence 
and distribution of major earthquakes.”2 Although Hagiwara, Wadati and others 
in the field were aware of Imamura’s activities, no one in either the ERI or the 
CMO was as actively engaged in prediction-related research as he was. When 
pressed by the Americans to share what they knew, the field’s spokesmen must 
have been torn; here was a topic the Americans were clearly interested in, and 
one that Imamura himself was sure to keep in the public eye if he could. And 
yet it would be fair to say that mainstream Japanese seismology had up until 
that point not embraced prediction as a prominent research goal. The fact that 
Imamura’s geodetic research was privately supported and not part of any uni-
versity- or state-funded project points to the persistent gap between institutional 
seismology’s priorities and the investments that prediction-related research 
would require. The field’s spokesmen’s rather cautious endorsement of predic-
tion’s possibilities was politically expedient in the sense that it engaged the 
Americans without promising them much. 
Beno Gutenberg’s arrival in Japan in early June marked a moment that both 
American officials and Japanese scientists had been waiting for. Gutenberg, 
who had just the year before become director of the Caltech Seismological Lab, 
had been asked to advise the Americans on their planned reorganization of 
Japanese earth sciences. Gutenberg’s work was well known in Japan, and to the 
extent that there was anything positive about American scrutiny, having some-
one of his stature involved was taken as a good sign by his Japanese counter-
parts. Seismologist and Professor of Physics at University of Tokyo Chūji 
Tsuboi was relieved to hear that Gutenberg was coming. Writing to Caltech in 
February 1947 in what he described as “the first letter which I send to America 
since 1941,” Tsuboi reported first that “My house was burnt and I lost most of 
my things which are necessary for every day life” before noting that “To-day, I 
heard that Dr. Gutenberg will perhaps visit Tokio. If this is true, I will be very 
very glad to see him again.”3 
                                                             
1  Report on Development of Research and Liaison Committee for Earthquake Forecasting, 
18/11/1947, Topical File, Earthquake, 1945-1952, Records of Allied Operational and Occupa-
tion Headquarters, World War II, 1907-1966, Record Group 331, National Archives at Col-
lege Park, College Park, MD. 
2  Ibid. 
3  Letter from Chūji Tsuboi to “Gentlemen,” 08/02/1947, Box 4, Folder 1, Papers of Beno Gu-
tenberg, California Institute of Technology Archives. Emphasis in original. 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  114 
Gutenberg was in Japan for less than a week, and the review on behalf of the 
Americans one of several projects on his itinerary. He met first with scientists 
and staff at the CMO accompanied by Chūji Tsuboi as a representative of the 
ERI, and by SCAP staffers. Tsuboi was later his host at the ERI, where they 
were joined by the newly appointed director of the CMO, Wadati Kiyoo. These 
meetings were followed by a conference with SCAP officials, and soon thereaf-
ter Gutenberg submitted a formal report. Most of the latter described the rela-
tive strengths and weaknesses of the Institute and the Observatory and offered a 
series of recommendations in support of initiatives to increase collaboration 
and cooperation across institutional boundaries. The ERI, part of the University 
of Tokyo, was under the authority of the Ministry of Education. The Ministry 
of Transportation controlled the CMO, and the Geodetic Survey Institute was 
part of the Home Ministry. Several other data-gathering facilities operated 
under still different administrative umbrellas. Gutenberg’s modest proposal that 
a Geophysical Committee be formed to bring together leading scholars from 
each facility and institute to coordinate research and data sharing stopped well 
short of calling for a sweeping restructuring or reallocation of resources. In-
stead, Gutenberg’s advice to the Americans was that they leave well enough 
alone so far as existing institutions were concerned, and that they take steps to 
help the geosciences community gain access to needed supplies (including 
journals from overseas).4 
Gutenberg also addressed earthquake prediction – with some reluctance, 
judging from the tone of his comments – because his hosts had raised the sub-
ject “repeatedly.” Gutenberg categorically ruled out the possibility of a suc-
cessful prediction at present, given the state of the field. “The claims of certain 
individuals that they can predict earthquakes are not restricted to Japan,” he 
wrote, “but have been disproved thus far in all instances.” This was a topic 
Gutenberg had addressed before, although not in the Japanese context. In late 
1935, he and Harry O. Wood co-authored a short article in Science in which 
they responded to press reports in the U.S. that had described recently pub-
lished research findings as having the potential to predict future earthquakes. 
Not so, they argued, noting that a valid prediction required considerably more 
specificity than any examples to date had been able to provide. While not rul-
ing out the possibility that research might someday provide clues that would 
allow earthquakes to be successfully predicted, they urged caution when it 
came to bringing untested claims forward. “Any moderately successful method 
of prediction for scientific testing will be welcomed by all seismologists,” they 
wrote, “but public prediction in the present state of knowledge is nothing short 
of a menace” (Wood 1935, 220). 
                                                             
4  Memorandum and Suggestions Concerning Geophysical and Especially Seismological Re-
search in Japan, 1947, Box 14, Folder 22, Papers of Beno Gutenberg, California Institute of 
Technology Archives. 
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Gutenberg’s comments on the state of prediction in Japan took a similarly 
cautious stance, but also reflected the range of opinions he had encountered in 
his discussions with Japanese colleagues. “It was the general consent that such 
forecast (time of occurrence within at least a week and accuracy of location 
within perhaps 50 miles),” he wrote, “is not possible at present. A very few 
views were expressed that the forecast of earthquakes is practically at hand. 
However the seismologists who have longer experience agreed that it will take 
a long time before forecast with a sufficient accuracy will be possible.” 
As dismissive as he was of claims that prediction was “practically at hand,” 
Gutenberg certainly did not rule out the possibility that it might one day be 
possible. To that end, “every effort should be made to furnish the foundations 
for such forecasts,” he argued, “such as study of changes in level, changes in 
electric currents in the earth, magnetic elements, in gravity, tilt, and their rela-
tionship to the occurrence of earthquakes.”5 It is interesting to note the similari-
ties between the assessment and future research agenda Gutenberg laid out 
here, and those offered by Wadati and Hagiwara in their meeting with SCAP 
officials earlier in the year. 
One way to read these conversations about prediction, then, is as having 
helped clarify for the Americans, and perhaps reassert for the Japanese seismo-
logical community, the boundaries of the field’s skepticism about earthquake 
prediction. To the extent that Gutenberg’s opinions can be thought of as reflect-
ing the consensus of mainstream seismology outside of Japan – a not unreason-
able conclusion, at least in 1947 – his visit allowed Japanese seismologists like 
Wadati, Tsuboi and their colleagues to situate themselves within that broader 
consensus. At the same time, their doubts about the claims of Imamura and 
others confident that prediction was within reach did not prevent them from 
seizing an opportunity to go against the field’s trajectory up to that point, and 
make the pursuit of prediction one of its central features. 
4.  The Earthquake Prediction Research and Liaison 
Committee 
By the end of the summer of 1947 earthquake prediction was a very visible 
component of Japanese seismology’s mission. The “Earthquake Prediction 
Research and Liaison Committee” (Jishin yochi mondai kenkyū renraku 
iinkai), which met for the first time in August, was the nation’s first state-
sanctioned attempt to coordinate and support inquiries into forecasting and 
prediction. It functioned by bringing together representatives of facilities and 
university departments with active seismology research or data-gathering pro-
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grams, including Wadati Kiyo (CMO), Takahashi Ryūtarō (ERI), Tsuboi Chūji 
(Tokyo University), Sassa Kenzō (Kyoto University), Nakamura Saemontarō 
(Tohoku University) and others; Imamura was one of several scientists invited to 
participate “as authorities in their fields.”6 The proposal to form the committee 
had originated with Wadati within a few days of Gutenberg’s visit to the CMO 
in early June. In a letter to a liaison officer at the 43rd Weather Wing, Wadati had 
asked for the Americans’ help developing a research initiative around earthquake 
forecasting research. Less than a week later, the Americans directed Wadati to 
“take immediate steps to begin organizing a committee consisting of interested 
Japanese scientists and organizations for coordinating research on earthquake 
forecasting problems.”7 By the end of the summer, the committee had already 
identified a half dozen research initiatives that merited support. 
And therein lay a problem. Committee members proposed, among other pro-
jects, the construction of ten new tidal gauge stations, nine rhombi (large sur-
vey sectors used to track vertical and horizontal displacement on the surface 
through precise measurements of changes in the distances and relative altitudes 
between points on the rhombus), improvements to a number of existing geodet-
ic facilities, and the purchase of a large number of sophisticated tiltmeters and 
other measuring devices. While not unreasonable given the committee’s mis-
sion and their informed understanding of what research on earthquake predic-
tion would require, the projects’ combined price tag came as quite a shock to 
the Americans. One estimate put the initial outlay at between 15 and 20 million 
yen, much more than SCAP was willing to authorize at a moment of general 
belt-tightening and budgetary restraint. The entire Ministry of Education re-
search budget in 1947 was just under 72 million yen (Nakayama, Gotō and 
Yoshioka 2001, 278). Within weeks of having taken the first steps toward 
collaborative research on earthquake prediction, the Americans sent a clear 
message that the Japanese were free to pursue the initiative only so long as it 
did not require additional resources. The Committee’s mandate to coordinate 
research and share information remained, but the proposals to fund new meas-
uring sites and facilities were put on hold. 
This setback is reminiscent of Imamura’s experience after the Great Kantō 
Earthquake, when his efforts to launch a large-scale survey and prediction 
research effort failed, at least in part because of concerns over its enormous 
cost. And yet the circumstances in 1947 were obviously different from those in 
                                                             
6  Preliminary Meeting on 11 August 1947, of the Research and Liaison Committee for Earth-
quake Forecasting at the Central Meteorological Observatory,” 12/08/1947, Topical File, 
Earthquake, 1945-1952, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World 
War II, 1907-1966, Record Group 331, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
7  Meeting of Research and Liaison Committee for Earthquake Forecasting on 29 August 1947, 
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tion Headquarters, World War II, 1907-1966, Record Group 331, National Archives at Col-
lege Park, College Park, MD. 
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1924; the committee’s very existence testified to earthquake prediction’s 
emerging legitimacy as a field of research, something that had certainly not 
been the case when Imamura was lobbying on his own for an expanded obser-
vational network. The arguments against funding the committee’s proposals in 
1947 had rested not on concerns about whether they lacked scientific merit. 
The physics seemed reasonable enough; the fiscal picture much less so. 
Also different was the number of scientists and institutions involved in 
earthquake prediction. Twenty years earlier Imamura had been the only seis-
mologist making claims in public about prediction’s efficacy. The new com-
mittee, in contrast, included many of the country’s leading authorities in seis-
mology and related fields, and representatives of most of its premier research 
institutions and academic departments. Although, as Gutenberg had noted, 
opinions differed among these scientists as to how close they were to being 
able to make valid predictions, the consensus was clearly in favor of moving 
forward with prediction-related research. Some of the enthusiasm for the com-
mittee’s goals was almost certainly tied to a belief that American support was 
the key to obtaining funding; cooperation across otherwise fiercely guarded 
institutional and functional borders may have been a price worth paying if it 
meant access to more and better resources. 
These factors, along with the broader social transformations underway in 
surrender’s wake, help provide some context for the decisions by Sassa Kenzō, 
Nakamura Saemontarō and others to issue public warnings – based on their 
findings from ongoing research projects – that damaging earthquakes would 
strike soon. The first in the series of four different warnings was made in 1947, 
the last in 1949. Each prediction relied on methods specific to the researcher 
involved, each located the area of greatest hazard in a different part of the 
country from the others, and each was widely reported by the media. None of 
them came true. 
5.  Predicting Earthquakes: 1947-1949 
Early signs that earthquake prediction was entering a new phase came in Au-
gust, when the popular daily newspaper the Nihon keizai shinbun (Japan Eco-
nomic News) featured side-by-side articles by Imamura Akitsune and K. 
Sagisaka, head of the Seismology Section at the Central Meteorological Obser-
vatory, each addressing this question: “Can Earthquakes be Foretold?” (Nippon 
Times 1947a) Imamura not surprisingly argued that they could. He described 
“observable delicate movements and inclinations of the ground, changes in the 
electricity and magnetism of the earth, and the muddle state of water under-
ground” as “forebodings” of an imminent event. “By observing these changes,” 
he argued, “one can foretell an earthquake several hours, or days, or months in 
advance.” Relating his own efforts from as early as 1929 to warn authorities of 
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the risk to the Nankai district, including his October 1946 lecture and the letters 
he dispatched to local authorities just prior to the 1946 Nankai earthquake, 
Imamura offered seemingly compelling evidence of how this could be done. 
Sagisaka took a much more conservative position. While he did not address 
Imamura’s claims, or any specific predictions, Sagisaka pointed out first that 
there were dozens if not hundreds of small earthquakes in Japan in any given 
month, the implication being that such large numbers prevented identification 
of those which might be precursors from those that were not. Nor, Sagisaka 
noted, had other approaches been productive: “We are carrying on intensive 
studies in the inclination of the ground, the electricity and magnetism of the 
earth, and the change in the speed of seismic waves,” he acknowledged, “but 
we have yet to possess ourselves of materials that can be relied upon to foretell 
an earthquake” (Nippon Times 1947a). 
Little in this exchange would have been surprising to members of the Earth-
quake Prediction Research and Liaison Committee, which held its first meet-
ings in August – both Imamura and Sagisaka were among its members, after all 
– but the article’s appearance does mark an interesting moment in terms of how 
prediction was being framed for public consumption. The juxtaposition of the 
two positions – one insisting that earthquake prediction was an impossibility, 
and the other that it was already at hand – did more than just draw attention to 
an ongoing debate within the scientific community. Where one stood on the 
question of whether earthquake prediction was possible or not had obvious 
implications for how to prioritize funding for seismological research, but more 
importantly that distinction also forced scientists and the public to begin to 
think through the implications of both sets of claims.  
A consensus that earthquake prediction was categorically impossible at cur-
rent levels of understanding and technical expertise meant that there was little 
that seismologists – or the Earthquake Prediction Research Committee – could 
do to protect the nation that they were not already attempting. More research 
and careful study lay ahead, goals well within the Committee’s remit to support 
and in keeping with the expertise of its members. Assertions that meaningful 
predictions were possible, on the other hand, had the potential to raise any 
number of questions about the way forward, among them several about the role 
that the scientists themselves would play in this new environment. Who would 
decide which warnings, if any, to share with the public, and what information 
would those warnings convey? What happened once a prediction was made 
public? What would scientists have the public and policy makers do once they 
knew when and where a damaging earthquake was expected to strike? As much 
as the Committee’s leadership may have wished to avoid dealing with ques-
tions such as these, their earliest meetings were hardly over before they were 
forced to deal with the first of what would become a cluster of highly visible 
prediction “events.” 
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Most of the earthquake predictions the Committee encountered over the next 
few years originated with Committee members, not with outsiders or non-
specialists. The first of its members to blur the line between prediction as a 
research problem and as a set of practices with public ramifications was Kyoto 
University Professor of Geophysics Sassa Kenzō. Sassa shared his concerns 
about the increased likelihood of a major earthquake in the Kansai area (a 
region that included the major metropolitan centers of Osaka, Kyoto and Kobe) 
with the Committee in August. Sassa had worked for several years on studies 
of surface deformation and tilting, and had installed a variety of precision tilt-
meters and other instrumentation at locations throughout the Kansai region in 
efforts to track such changes over time. “Earthquake prediction was never 
realized,” Sassa suggested to the committee, “because of the lack of precise 
geophysical measurements in a station network in the vicinity of an earthquake 
prior to its occurrence.”8 It was his belief, in other words, that displacements in 
the earth’s surface preceded earthquakes, and that careful measurements would 
reveal those changes in time to provide warning of an impending seismic event. 
This was not a new argument, since Imamura had made similar ones before 
about the Nankai earthquake, and the Committee’s proposals for an expanded 
tidal gauge network and geodetic rhombi relied on the same principals and 
assumptions. Two things set Sassa’s approach apart from the general work of 
the Committee, however. One was that he was drawing quite specific conclu-
sions about the short term risk of a major earthquake in the Kansai area on the 
basis of data already in hand. The other was that he shared his concerns directly 
with the public. 
Sassa offered his take on prediction’s potential in public lectures, edited ver-
sions of which appeared in September as a thirty-page pamphlet provocatively 
titled When Will the Kinki Earthquake Occur? (Kinki jishin wa itsu kuru ka) 
(Sassa 1947) Although the text provided readers with an introduction of sorts to 
seismology and earthquake mechanics, Sassa’s main topics were prediction and 
hazard mitigation. These were not unrelated, in that Sassa sought to impress 
readers with the importance of understanding the risks they and their communi-
ties faced while at the same time providing some insight into the steps they 
(and the government) should take to protect themselves from harm. A com-
plaint Sassa returned to repeatedly was that neither the public nor officials were 
doing nearly enough to plan ahead for the calamities that were all but certain to 
occur. The costly rebuilding then underway in the aftermath of the Nankai 
earthquake, he pointed out, was taking place without any regard for the fact 
that the region was still seismically active. Millions of yen would be spent on 
projects that would just have to be rebuilt again when the next earthquake 
struck. Sassa’s point was that it was altogether possible to significantly reduce 
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the hazards to communities by improving building practices, or by drawing in 
other ways on what scientists already knew about earthquakes to create a better 
informed and thus safer citizenry. Money that had gone toward the war effort 
could now be: 
[U]tilized for public welfare work, such as a long range program for earth-
quake-proof construction as a national project. This would eventually mean 
saving many human lives, an immeasurable amount of property and wealth. 
However, the most important step to be taken now, is to popularize knowledge 
concerning the nature of earthquakes and practical methods for preventing 
major destruction (Sassa 1947, 2). 
A corollary to Sassa’s insistence that more attention be paid to how to defend 
against earthquake hazards was his explanation of why he and scientists like 
him were so certain that the risks were real and persistent. On his way to mak-
ing a specific point about the risk to the Kinki district, Sassa offered a more 
general and vivid argument about earthquake mechanics. He described Japan, 
and the main island of Honshu in particular, as subject to massive forces that 
were pushing some parts of it ever so slowly in one direction, and other parts of it 
in another. Sassa asked readers to imagine a line drawn from Ise Bay to Wakasa 
Bay, bisecting Japan’s main island through the Kansai district. The area west of 
that line, including Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe, was being pushed northwest; to the 
east of the line, the main island was shifting toward the southeast. “It signifies,” 
Sassa wrote, “that the force which formed the Japan island arc is still functioning, 
and causing these earthquakes. It is reasonable to conclude that the severe earth-
quakes which have been occurring in this area for the past several hundreds of 
thousands of years will still continue to occur” (Sassa 1947, 7). 
Earthquakes happened when the strain that had been built up in the earth’s 
crust along boundaries like those Sassa had described, was released. The small, 
frequent resolutions of tension that produced tremors unnoticed by average 
citizens were one marker of these ongoing larger processes. But, Sassa pointed 
out, records going back to the seventh and eighth centuries indicated that the 
Kinki region was subject to regular (but not necessarily periodic) major earth-
quakes, suggesting that something about the underlying geological structures 
allowed strain to build over long periods of time, only to release it in sudden, 
cataclysmic events. “The energy thus stored between occurrence of major 
earthquakes,” Sassa wrote, “is of the order of a thousand to a hundred thousand 
of that of an atomic bomb” (Sassa 1947, 4). His own calculations led him to 
conclude that despite the two recent earthquakes in the region – in 1944 and 
1946 – unreleased strain was still present, which meant that the district was still 
in a seismically active phase. It is striking to think that Sassa chose to use a 
comparison with the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki – in 1947 
still very recent events – to convey to readers something of the power of the 
forces at work nearby. 
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Having given readers reason to think that there were steps they could take to 
mitigate future harm, and reason to think that the risks were real and signifi-
cant, Sassa still had to somehow address the question posed in the pamphlet’s 
title: When would the Kinki earthquake strike? The short answer was that sci-
entists were not sure, at least not sure enough to offer an unqualified prediction. 
Sassa described for his readers the different indicators that he and scientists like 
him were using as they tried to get closer to being able to actually predict an 
earthquake: measurements of horizontal and vertical crustal displacement, of 
changes in magnetism and electric currents, and in well water turbulence were 
among the ones cited. Sassa was careful not to create the expectation that predic-
tions were or could be 100 percent accurate, and went so far as to point out that 
“[i]n our present society, earthquake forecasting would do more harm by unnec-
essarily exciting mass fear rather than promoting the undertaking of logical pre-
cautionary measures.” Sassa clearly wanted to keep the focus on the pursuit of 
“logical precautionary measures” as best he could, while at the same time es-
tablishing a reasonable degree of heightened concern in his target audience. 
Of the various earthquake warnings that surfaced that fall and into the next 
year, Sassa’s published work and public statements were arguably the most 
balanced and thoughtful. In addition to highlighting risks and introducing pre-
dictive methods and technologies to a wide audience, they also pointed toward 
policies that could help mitigate against potential harms. Sassa, for example, 
gave detailed, practical instructions for surviving an earthquake – which parts 
of the house were safest, how to fight fires, and so on – bundled with calls for 
better public policy in light of what they knew of the nation’s own experiences, 
and the ongoing threats it faced. Referencing the devastating fires that followed 
the Kantō earthquake, Sassa highlighted the failures of planning and behavior 
that allowed the conflagration to spread, concluding that “It isn’t as if such 
catastrophes were unavoidable. They could have been avoided, but were not.” 
Careful preparation would go a long way toward preventing anything similar 
from happening when the next earthquake struck. 
Over the next several months, the nuanced tone Sassa might have hoped to 
preserve in discussions of what prediction was and what it was not, and what 
people ought to be thinking about most in light of the risks they faced, was lost. 
Two developments established the tone and focus of the public discourse on 
prediction. First, the Mainichi newspaper reported on 11 September 1947 that 
Seiichi Yamaguchi of the Home Ministry’s Geographical Research Bureau had 
predicted that a major earthquake would strike the Kantō district within the 
next three or four months – he had apparently named either December 1947 or 
January 1948 as the likeliest times (Mainichi shinbun 1947). 
The basis for his claim was his observation that the sea level as measured at 
the western tip of the Miura peninsula, not far from Tokyo, had declined rapid-
ly in June, July and August. As Yamaguchi pointed out to reporters, similar 
changes in sea level – which indicated vertical displacements in the land at 
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water’s edge – had been reported around the time of the Kantō earthquake, and 
prior to the 1946 Nankai earthquake too. Unless the levels returned to normal, 
Yamaguchi warned, a major earthquake could occur in the very near future. 
The second development was Sassa’s own announcement in December 1947 
that he had spotted anomalous and worrying results from instrumentation in-
stalled in an unused railway tunnel on the outskirts of Kyoto. Although neither 
Sassa’s initial public foray in September nor Yamaguchi’s announcement that 
same month had generated much press coverage at the time, Sassa’s statement 
in early December triggered interest in both predictions. The Asahi was the first 
to break the news of the warning Sassa had delivered to local police officials on 
5 December 1947, which read: 
There has been an abrupt change in the indication of the tiltmeter and dilatom-
eter which were set up in Osakayama as the network for the prediction of 
earthquakes. Precaution is especially necessary now from the standpoint of the 
prevention of disaster. It is urgently required that a committee for the earth-
quake be selected as soon as possible (Asahi shinbun 1947). 
The measuring devices had been in place in the tunnel since August. According 
to Sassa, beginning in mid-October they had begun to record an accelerated 
rate of contraction of the earth’s surface along an axis running from the south-
east to the northwest. Sassa interpreted this to mean that much more strain than 
normal was accumulating in the district, and that therefore the risk of a cata-
strophic release of that tension was also much higher than normal. Nowhere in 
the article is Sassa cited as having named a date, or even a time frame, for 
when the earthquake he feared might strike. 
The day after the article appeared in the Asahi, the Yomiuri began its own 
coverage with a story that brought together Yamaguchi’s prediction of a few 
months earlier of an imminent Kantō earthquake with Sassa’s cautions about 
the next big quake in the Kansai district. The report explained how anomalous 
readings from devices designed to precisely measure changes in the earth’s 
surface had led scientists in each instance to issue their respective warnings. 
The “rumor on the forecast of the occurrence of the great earthquake has pre-
vailed based on the movement of the earth crust which has become more active 
all over the country,” according to SCAP’s translation of the article, “with the 
result that the restless feelings of the postwar public are further intensified” 
(Yomiuri shinbun 1947). 
The distinction between legitimate warning and rumors, and between the re-
sponses the scientists had hoped to provoke and the actual reactions of the 
citizenry came into sharper focus over the next several weeks. References to 
the “restless feelings of the postwar public” were replaced by descriptions of 
outright panic, “widespread repercussions and fear,” and reports that the resi-
dents of at least one community in the Kansai district had already begun to flee 
their homes and abandon their village altogether, fearing a repeat of the devas-
tating December 1946 Nankai quake (Nippon Times 1947c). A small but no-
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ticeable earthquake north of Osaka on 10 December heightened the sense of 
urgency Sassa had sought to convey in his warning to local officials. That there 
was a degree of disconnect between what Sassa had thought he was saying (or 
would later claim to have said), however, and what local officials were hearing, 
also became clear. “We were told by Dr. Sassa that an earthquake would cer-
tainly happen,” reported the Chief of the Kyoto Prefectural Police, “conse-
quently we are hurriedly organizing counter-measures.”9 In the context of re-
ports of pre-emptive evacuations, fishermen pulling their nets from the water, 
and the Chief’s definitive statement about the need to act quickly, it would 
appear that many had understood Sassa’s warnings as a call to immediate and 
definitive action.  
Sassa’s stated goals for issuing the December warning – to alert the public 
to the increased risk, and to make officials and average citizens aware of the 
steps they could take to mitigate the harm that an earthquake might cause – 
were in tension almost from the start not just with the public’s jittery response, 
as we have seen, but also with those of his colleagues on the Earthquake Pre-
diction Research Committee. A similar set of tensions were evident following 
Yamaguchi’s statements warning of an imminent earthquake in the Kantō 
district, and later in the wake of prediction events in 1948 and 1949. 
One set of tensions took the form of debates over what scientists could do 
with the data to which they had access. By late 1947 the Committee and to 
some extent the broader community of earth scientists in Japan had agreed 
upon a shared definition of how predictions might eventually be produced, and 
had developed lists of the different measurements that together might yield 
viable predictions. That list included the same tools that both Sassa and Yama-
guchi had deployed and read, and which had prompted them to issue their 
warnings. In Yamaguchi’s case, the instruments in question were tidal gauges; 
for Sassa, tiltmeters and strain gauges. The questions to be addressed in the 
wake of the announcements by Sassa and Yamaguchi were therefore less about 
the potential value of the data – the connections to earthquake prediction hav-
ing already been established – than to how to interpret that information, and 
whether it met the criteria for prediction. 
In a pattern that was established soon after Yamaguchi’s pronouncements in 
September, Wadati Kiyoo became the go-to scientist for reporters in need of an 
official response to earthquake predictions and the warnings attached to them. 
Wadati’s credentials were impeccable. Internationally, his seminal work on 
seismic activity deep in the earth’s crust established the existence of what 
would eventually be known as Wadati-Benioff Zones. Locally, as both chair of 
the Earthquake Prediction Research and Liaison Committee and Director of the 
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1951, Records of Allied Operational and Occupation Headquarters, World War II, 1907-1966, 
Record Group 331, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD. 
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CMO, Wadati spoke as a recognized national authority on earthquakes and as a 
senior representative of the state’s own research apparatus. Wadati was also 
consistent; while never going so far as to question his colleagues’ judgment 
outright, he could be counted on to cast doubt on findings that relied on limited 
evidence, as he viewed it, and thus to reassure the public that their worst fears 
would likely not come true. In early December, in the same article that linked 
the predictions by Sassa and Yamaguchi, Wadati suggested that “It can’t be 
definitively determined whether such disparate phenomena are actually indica-
tions of an earthquake or not” (Yomiuri 1947). A few days later a long piece by 
Wadati in the Yomiuri newspaper explained the difference between fore-
knowledge of an earthquake, described as information that a major earthquake 
was likely, without being able to specificy a time or place, and forecasting, 
which Wadati equated to predicting an earthquake much as one would the 
weather, within very narrow ranges of time and place (Wadati 1947). Wadati’s 
opinion was that such forecasting might be possible to some degree at some 
point, but certainly not at the present time. He was much more optimistic about 
“foreknowledge,” but asserted that better equipment was absolutely essential 
before even that degree of predictive practice could be achieved. “At present,” he 
wrote, “the earthquake research equipments are too poor to foretell the occur-
rence” of an event. “Plainly speaking, at the present stage of our science, it is 
impossible to foreknow exactly the place, time and scale of an earthquake.” 10 
Wadati never came right out and said that Yamaguchi and Sassa were 
wrong, and instead implied that he shared the confusion he imagined the public 
must be experiencing. How could Yamaguchi and Sassa be right if, as Wadati 
suggested, the science didn’t support their claims? Here Wadati did offer a 
partial answer. “Sometimes,” he reflected, “seismologists may conceive the 
probability of a large earthquake from his researches and observations, and 
publish it as their own responsibility.” When that happened, concluded Wadati 
– and here his word choice is perhaps deliberately ambiguous – he urged peo-
ple to “be vigilant.” Was he calling on them to heed the warnings that such 
seismologists might offer and take care against the hazards they highlighted, or 
was he calling on the public to be skeptical of such claims, and to guard against 
being misled?  
Wadati’s cautions reflect a second set of tensions made evident as predic-
tions surfaced in 1947 and 1948. These tensions appeared as debates among 
Earthquake Prediction Research Committee scientists about their individual 
and collective responsibility to share their findings with the public. Wadati and 
other Tokyo-based scientists belonged to one camp, and sought to err on the 
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side of caution. Because “accurate earthquake prediction was still not possible 
with present theoretical knowledge, observational methods and data,” they 
argued, “scientists should not make guesses which would disturb the public or 
lead them to be alarmed.”11 In December, Wadati put several proposals before 
the committee, including one that would have required its members to submit 
predictions or warnings to the group for review before making them public. 
That proposal failed. Wadati’s suggestion that the committee draft a white 
paper that explained earthquake prediction to the public also ran into opposi-
tion; members feared that the press would garble their message, or twist it into 
something sensationalistic (Jishin yochi renrakukai 1979, 20-2). 
A second cluster of scientists – including Yamaguchi, Sassa, and Nakamura 
Saemontarō – held firm to the idea that they owed it to the public to issue warn-
ings when the evidence merited it. A summary of committee discussions on 
this subject in January 1948 has them asserting that “it was a scientist’s duty to 
make practical use of his knowledge for public welfare.”12 The decision to 
announce findings, even those that had the potential to be disruptive, was theirs 
to make. Similar statements by Sassa appeared in print in mid-December, when 
it was reported that he had criticized “seismologists who withheld news of 
possible earthquakes because they “weren’t sure.’ It is the duty of these men, 
he declared, to warn the people.”13 
At the same time, Sassa was not uncritical of the press, and was wary of 
how the public had reacted after he had issued his warnings in December. In 
both news accounts and then at the January meeting of the Committee (the first 
such session to attract an audience of journalists), Sassa insisted that he had 
never actually predicted that an earthquake was imminent, as some press out-
lets had claimed. What he had done, he said, was to call on local authorities and 
the public to exercise due caution against the possibility of one occurring soon-
er than might have been expected, given what seemed to him to be unexpected 
changes in the behavior of the region’s topography. Complaining that “his 
views had been ‘distorted and misconstrued,’” all he had wanted was for the 
public to practice better fire prevention methods, and to reinforce those build-
ings most at risk of collapsing should an earthquake strike. The wild rumors 
and panicked citizens were the media’s doing, not his (Nippon Times 1947b; 
Jishin yochi renrakukai 1979, 19). Yamaguchi, somewhat more quickly than 
Sassa, had also argued that the press had misconstrued his meaning, and that he 
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had not intended his announcement to be taken as a prediction that an earth-
quake was imminent. 
The combination of Wadati’s public reassurances, and the statements by 
both Yamaguchi and Sassa that neither had actually predicted an earthquake, 
seems to have prevented signs of unrest in the areas implicated in their warn-
ings from growing worse. No additional reports of hurried flight from at-risk 
villages surfaced, no damaging earthquakes occurred, and media interest 
waned. Although committee members remained divided around questions of 
their responsibilities to the public and how to interpret their research findings, 
as of January 1948 the atmosphere of crisis appeared to have passed. 
It was not long before another prediction repeated the cycle of public unrest 
and expert intervention. One of the papers given at the June 1948 meeting of 
the Committee introduced recent work by Inoue Win, of the CMO, on fore- and 
aftershocks associated with large earthquakes. Inoue had been studying “the 
propagation of earthquake stress or strain waves,” in part by looking for rela-
tionships between the timing and the longitude and latitude of seismic activity 
throughout Japan. He soon realized that the interactions of the waves seemed to 
correlate over time with when and where large earthquakes would strike. Prelim-
inary work using data from events many years past seemed to successfully “pre-
dict” earthquakes that were known to have occurred, suggesting that these same 
methods could be used for earthquakes that were still weeks or months away 
from happening. At the meeting at which he presented his work, Committee 
members showed polite interest, and Inoue was encouraged to come back with 
more evidence – his colleagues were especially curious to see how well this 
approach did at predicting, retroactively, a wider range of past earthquakes.14 
Inoue’s presentation was unusual in part because it offered an approach to 
prediction that was not driven solely by the hunt for elusive precursors; his 
theory that strain waves propagated earthquakes in patterns that possessed a 
certain mathematical elegance was a far cry from the comparatively primitive 
tools the field had been relying on up to that point. What ultimately made the 
presentation memorable, however, was not so much the promise of the theory 
but instead Inoue’s rather offhand response to what at the time seemed to be a 
not very serious question. Asked by one of the committee members where his 
calculations predicted Japan’s next major earthquakes would occur, Inoue 
answered that Fukui, a city (and prefecture) on the Japan Sea coast, and Chi-
chibu, a town (and district) west of Tokyo, were likely locations. He was not 
pressed to offer additional details, and neither Inoue nor others present seem to 
                                                             
14  Meeting of Research and Liaison Committee for Earthquake Forecasting, 9 June 1948, 
19/06/1948, Topical File, Earthquake, 1945-1952, Records of Allied Operational and Occupa-
tion Headquarters, World War II, 1907-1966, Record Group 331, National Archives at Col-
lege Park, College Park, MD. 
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have given the exchange much thought. SCAP’s notes on the meeting make no 
mention of it. 
A little more than two weeks after Inoue’s presentation, Fukui suffered a 
massive earthquake, the nation’s deadliest since 1923. More than 3,700 people 
were killed, and some 20,000 reported injured. Fires in the city burned for five 
days before being brought under control. News reports that Inoue had predicted 
the Fukui earthquake appeared not long after, as did warnings that he had iden-
tified Chichibu as next in line to be struck.  
The media frenzy and expressions of dismay by Chichibu’s residents that 
followed were on a much larger scale than the turmoil that had accompanied 
the Kantō and Kansai predictions of only a few months before. Speaking to a 
packed auditorium at the University of Tokyo in early July, Inoue tried very 
hard to present his work as speculative, and his findings as preliminary. When 
pressed during a question-and-answer session at the end of his talk, however, 
Inoue again specified the location (the Chichibu mountain range), the timing 
(late August or early September) and the severity (not very – perhaps strong 
enough to collapse a few homes) of the nation’s next earthquake (Asahi shin-
bun 1948; Jishin yochi renrakukai 1979, 23). Chichibu residents did not re-
spond well to this news; some fled outright, while others desperately sought 
advice from officials and scientists about what steps they could take to defend 
their communities and homes. Inoue’s announcement reportedly forced the 
governor of Saitama to cut short a trip to Fukui, where he had been inspecting 
the effects of that district’s recent earthquake, in order to begin preparing his 
own prefecture for a similar calamity. 
It is possible to overstate the Committee’s role in calming the waters as the 
“deadline” for the Chichibu event approached, not least because the most de-
tailed accounts of how the press and the public were eventually reassured that 
Inoue had been mistaken are themselves written by Committee members. Ac-
cording to one such account, after attempts by several CMO scientists to repli-
cate Inoue’s results failed, suggesting that the relationship between his “predic-
tion” and the Fukui earthquake was purely accidental, Inoue himself readily 
acknowledged the need for further study, and was more than willing to admit as 
much to the press and public. The more Inoue tried to explain that he had 
been mistaken, and that Chichibu was almost certainly not at risk (at least not 
because of the mechanisms that Inoue’s hypothesis had pointed toward), 
however, the less the press seemed willing to believe him. At a closed-door 
meeting of the Committee in late July, Inoue again agreed with his colleagues 
that there was much more work to be done, but insisted that he simply could 
not get the press to believe him when he tried to explain that his comments 
about Chichibu had been a mistake. He appealed to the Committee, therefore, 
to speak on his behalf. 
At least some members of the Committee were happy to do. Chairman 
Wadati used the blackboard to draft a statement, revising the text with input 
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from other members, and called a press conference for a little after noon. 
“Committee member Inoue today made it clear,” Wadati said, “that he shares 
the Committee’s findings that his statistical methodology is at present not very 
effective in terms of earthquake prediction.” Noting that Inoue’s work had 
many merits, and that the Committee had urged him to continue with it, Wadati 
suggested that perhaps it would be best if he shared the elements related to 
earthquake prediction with the public only after further, thorough review 
(Jishin yochi renrakukai 1979, 23-4; Hiroi 1995, 211-6). 
As before, these interventions by the Committee coincided with diminished 
anxiety in the communities that had been named in the prediction. Once August 
and September passed without an earthquake in the Chichibu district, the 
Committee’s foresight and caution seemed all the more justified. (The first 
significant postwar earthquake in the Kantō region did not occur until 1987, 
and was centered in Chiba prefecture, east of Tokyo.) 
The final episode in this cluster of predictions had its origins in the after-
math of the Fukui earthquake. In early 1949, Committee member and Tohoku 
University Professor Nakamura Saemontarō announced to the press that Niiga-
ta city should expect a major earthquake within the next one to two months. 
(Niigata had a population of around 300,000 at the time.) Nakamura had spent 
part of 1948 after the Fukui earthquake engaged in careful studies of terrestrial 
magnetism all along the Japan Sea coast, and was alarmed by anomalous read-
ings in the vicinity of Niigata. When the changes he had been observing in the 
district abruptly stopped in February 1949, Nakamura interpreted those results 
– based on historical precedent, he claimed – as precursory to an imminent 
earthquake in the area (Jishin yochi renrakukai 1979, 24). 
The results of his announcement were in keeping with past experience. The 
Niigata prefectural government dispatched the deputy governor to Tokyo to 
consult with the Committee, the governor advised citizens to prepare, just in 
case, and extra building supplies were made available to city residents anxious 
to reinforce their homes. In late March, Nakamura was asked to report on his 
methods and findings to the Committee. They were not well received; many of 
those present at the meeting found fault with Nakamura’s approach, and disa-
greed even more strongly with his conclusions. It may not have helped Naka-
mura’s standing with the committee that back in July 1948, even as concerns 
over Inoue’s prediction were playing out in the press, a quote from Nakamura 
had appeared in the Yomiuri newspaper essentially calling out his colleagues 
for holding on to old-fashioned, out of date ideas about prediction. “A long 
time ago, it was true that seismologists didn’t really have anything worth say-
ing to the public about earthquake prediction,” Nakamura stated, “but even 
now that barrier still exists, and many people believe that is better not to say 
anything about predictions. Personally, I think that time has passed. I have no 
use for seismologists who won’t provide forecasts, or get angry when one is 
produced” (Nakamura 1948). 
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Although Nakamura pushed back hard in defense of his work and his deci-
sion to warn the public, his colleagues on the Committee took the unusual step 
of issuing a press release critical of both Nakamura’s research and his an-
nouncement. “In seismology’s present state, as has been stated many times, it is 
impossible to make a definitive earthquake prediction,” the Committee stated.  
The recent Niigata Earthquake Theory was in the form of a caution that 
emerged from Professor Nakamura’s ongoing research, and yet, again refer-
ring to the state of seismology right now, it is the opinion of most of the mem-
bers of the Committee that it would be premature to consider his caution as 
equivalent to an actual earthquake prediction (Jishin yochi renrakukai 1979, 24). 
6.  Conclusion 
The Earthquake Prediction Research and Liaison Committee stopped doing 
anything noteworthy not long after the resolution of the Niigata predictions, 
and for many years thereafter the nation experienced neither major earthquakes 
nor well-publicized predictions. Many of those involved in making or respond-
ing to these early episodes of predictions, however, did go on to play key roles 
in the construction of Japan’s next, more sustained attempt at organized, state-
sanctioned earthquake prediction research. 
The 1962 publication of Earthquake Prediction: Current Status and a Plan 
for Development (Jishin yochi: Genjō to sono suishin keikaku) (Jishin yochi 
keikaku kenkyū gurupu 1962) marked the return of prediction as a priority for 
the field, and of a deliberate effort to avoid the pitfalls of the late 1940s. That 
document showcased a consensus among Japanese seismology’s leading schol-
ars that with adequate research support, they would soon be able to predict 
seismic events. The “Blueprint,” as the report quickly came to be known, out-
lined the steps that researchers and the state needed to take in order to make 
earthquake prediction a practical reality. Perhaps not surprisingly, these steps 
were quite similar to those that had been central to the plans these same scien-
tists – Wadati Kiyoo, Tsuboi Chūji, and Hagiwara Takahirō among them – had 
outlined in 1947. This time around, however, the scientists both cultivated 
political alliances that began to provide them with the resources they had long 
sought, and worked very hard to regularize and manage how predictions and 
warnings would be assessed and shared with the public.  
The June 1964 Niigata Earthquake, and the onset of the Matsushiro Cluster 
Earthquakes the following August further focused the attention of policy mak-
ers and seismologists; the formation of the Coordinating Committee for Earth-
quake Prediction (Jishin yochi renrakukai) in April 1969, chaired by Hagiwara 
Takahirō, was one outcome of an emerging alliance between scientists in lead-
ing research universities and policy makers in the Ministry of Education and 
other state agencies, around prediction’s potential (Jishin yochi renrakukai 
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1979, 35). A telling difference between this committee and its 1947 predeces-
sor is that “research” disappeared from the language it used to describe itself to 
the public. One can read many things into this absence, but a reasonable con-
clusion would be that by 1969 it had been decided that the time for emphasiz-
ing research had passed, and that the committee’s preferred mission was in-
stead the actual practice of prediction (Geller 2011, 89). 
The 1978 Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeasures Act – often identified 
as the Coordinating Committee’s crowning achievement – makes it clear that at 
some point the reliability and utility of earthquake prediction had become giv-
ens (Ishibashi 1982). The Act’s underlying premise was that earthquake predic-
tion was possible in the present; it allowed for the designation of districts 
known to be at high risk for a major event, put in place protocols for the evalu-
ation of precursors and other signs indicative of an imminent earthquake, and 
both established clear channels of communication for the dissemination of 
warnings and granted the state sweeping powers to shut down transportation 
networks, public gatherings, and otherwise act to keep people out of harm’s 
way. One can certainly see in the Countermeasures Act the culmination, for 
better or for worse, of more than thirty years of iterative negotiations between 
earthquake prediction as a technical practice and prediction as an intervention 
in everyday life. At the very least, the Act provided seemingly definitive an-
swers to questions that had confounded the Committee in the late 1940s, 
among them how to decide when a prediction was merited, who spoke for the 
field, and what could be done to manage the disruption and fear that such an 
announcement might provoke. 
The Act has not yet been tested. Its procedures and the bulk of the predictive 
efforts associated with them target the so-called Tōkai earthquake, a much 
anticipated and feared event that if it happens will likely cause tremendous 
harm to Nagoya, Shizuoka and many other communities in some of Japan’s 
most heavily urbanized areas. As noted at the beginning of this article, doubts 
have begun to mount about the commitment of attention and resources to this 
single district and methodology and about the assumptions that underpin those 
commitments, but there are as yet few indications that Japan’s earth scientists 
or the state agencies that support their work plan to turn their backs on predic-
tion any time soon. 
One observation that follows from thinking about the place of the late 1940s 
cluster of warnings in the longer history of the earth sciences and earthquake 
prediction in Japan is that changes in how the field and the state related to 
prediction do not seem to have been closely tied to shifts in how scientists 
themselves understood earthquakes. The activities around prediction in the 
1940s and again in the early 1960s were not directly associated with the intro-
duction of new theoretical frameworks for explaining seismicity. Later, even 
the acceptance of plate tectonics theory by the seismological community in 
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Japan over the course of the 1960s does not appear to have changed how practi-
tioners approached prediction so much as it reinforced existing discourses.  
A second observation is that it took a long time for research into earthquake 
prediction and hazard mitigation policies based on that research to acquire scien-
tific and political legitimacy. One might assume, given its prominence in recent 
years, that prediction had long been at the core of how the state and seismology 
chose to respond to the very real hazards that earthquakes posed for Japan. This is 
not so. Though many of the basic principles informing present day efforts at 
prediction were spelled out in Imamura’s 1924 proposal to remake seismology’s 
research agenda, neither that proposal nor the agenda set out more than twenty 
years later by the Earthquake Prediction Research and Liaison Committee trig-
gered lasting changes in how earth scientists and policy makers dealt with earth-
quake prediction. Fifteen more years passed before the 1962 “Blueprint” de-
scribed a way forward for the field in which prediction played a meaningful role, 
and it wasn’t until 1978 that the Large-Scale Earthquake Countermeasures Act 
tied earthquake prediction to hazard mitigation efforts. 
As earth scientists, policy makers, and the Japanese public consider the haz-
ards they face in the present day, it is worth wondering whether prediction’s 
idiosyncratic past has been a barrier to a more open discussion of its future 
role. Although the attempts by Sassa and his colleagues to make prediction 
work in Occupied Japan did not succeed, their efforts, like those of Imamura 
before them, have become part of a narrative that celebrates their tenacity and 
foresight, and connects them to the brighter history of recent decades, in which 
earthquake prediction has been central to the government’s hazard mitigation 
policies and in which research funds for those projects have flowed freely 
(Nihon jishin gakkai 2013). Moving away from prediction as earth science’s 
most valuable contribution to the public welfare entails at some level a chal-
lenge to that by now well established narrative. Focusing on earthquakes that 
didn’t happen is, perhaps, one useful approach to a rethinking of that history. 
References 
Asahi shinbun. 1947. Kansai ni chikaku jishin [An Earthquake Soon in the Kansai], 
09/12/1947. 
Asahi shinbun. 1948. Jishin wa yochi dekiru ka? Genj de wa muri [Can Earth-
quakes be Predicted? It is Impossible at Present], 02/07/1948. 
Clancey, Gregory K. 2006. Earthquake Nation: the Cultural Politics of Japanese 
Seismicity, 1868-1930. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Clancey, Gregory K. 2012. Japanese Seismicity and the Limits of Prediction. The 
Journal of Asian Studies 71 (2): 333-44. 
Dower, John W. 1999. Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II. New 
York: W. W. Norton & Co./The New Press. 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  132 
Fan, Fa-ti. 2012. Science, State, and Citizens: Notes from Another Shore. Osiris 27: 
227-49. 
Geller, Robert J. 2011. Nihonjin Wa Shiranai ‘Jishin Yochi’ No Shōtai [The Truth 
about Earthquake Prediction: What the Japanese Don’t Know]. Tokyo: Futabasha. 
Hagiwara, Takahiro. 1982. Jishingaku Hyakunen [One Hundred Years of Seismolo-
gy]. Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai. 
Hiroi, Osamu. 1995. Saigai to Nihonjin: Kyodai Jishin No Shakai Shinri. Shinpan 
[Disaster and the Japanese: The Social Psychology of Giant Earthquakes. New 
edition]. Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshinsha. 
Hough, Susan Elizabeth. 2010. Predicting the Unpredictable: The Tumultuous 
Science of Earthquake Prediction. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Imamura, Akitsune. 1905. Shigaichi ni okeru jisshin no seimei oyobi zaisan ni 
taisuru songai o keigen suru kanhō [Methods for Reducing the Damage to Life 
and Property Associated with an Urban Earthquake]. Taiyō 11 (12): 162-71. 
Imamura, Akitsune. 1923. Daijishin chōsa nikki [Diary of the Investigation of the 
Great Earthquake]. Kagaku chishiki 1923: 12-37. 
Imamura, Akitsune. 1924. Sono ato no daijishin chōsa [Subsequent Investigation of 
the Great Earthquake]. Kagaku chishiki 1924: 2-23. 
Imamura, Akitsune. 1933. Nankaidōoki daijishin no nazo [The Mystery of the Great 
Nankaidō-oki Earthquake]. Jishin 5 (10): 607-26. 
Ishibashi, Katsuhiko. 1982. A Practical Strategy for Earthquake Prediction. In 
Earthquake Prediction Techniques: Their Application in Japan, ed. Asada Toshi, 
249-70. Tokyo: Tokyo University Press. 
Jishin yochi keikaku kenkyū gurupu. 1962. Jishin yochi: Genjō to sono suishin 
keikaku [Earthquake Prediction: Current Status and a Plan for Development]. 
Tokyo: Jishin yochi keikaku kenkyū gurupu. 
Jishin yochi renrakukai [Coordinating Committee for Earthquake Prediction]. 1979. 
Jishin Yochi Renrakukai 10-Nen No Ayumi. Yatabe-machi (Ibaraki-ken) [A Ten-
year History of the Coordinating Committee for Earthquake Prediction]. Tokyo: 
Kankōsha Kokudo Chiriin Nihon Sokuryō Kyōkai.  
Mainichi shinbun. 1947. Kantō ni Daijishin Setsu [The Argument for a Large 
Earthquake in the Kantō District]. 11/09/1947. 
Naikakufu seifu kōhōshitsu [Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, Government 
Public Relations]. 1978. Shōbō – jishin ni kansu yoron chōsa. 1958. [Public 
Opinion Poll on Firefighting and Earthquakes, 1958] <http://www8.cao.go. 
jp/survey/s53/S53-10-53-10.html> (Accessed November 30, 2011). 
Nakamura Saemontarō. 1948. Gakusha to Jishin [Scholars and Earthquakes]. 
Yomiuri shinbun, 05/07/1947. 
Nakayama, Shigeru, Kunio Gotō, and Hiotschi Yoshioka. 2001. A Social History of 
Science and Technology in Contemporary Japan. Melbourne and Portland: Trans 
Pacific Press distributors for USA and Canada International Specialized Book 
Services (Japanese society series). 
Nihon Jisshin gakkai. 2013. “Burupurinto” 50 shūnen jishin kenkyū no ayumi to 
kongo [The Fiftieth Anniversary of ‘The Blueprint:’ Seismology’s Progress to 
Date and Its Future Course]. Tokyo: Nihon jishin gakkai. 
Nippon Times. 1947a. Can Earthquakes be Foretold?, 07/08/1947. 
Nippon Times. 1947b. Savant Denies Making Definite Quake Forecast, 17/12/1947. 
HSR 40 (2015) 2  │  133 
Nippon Times. 1947c. Kansai ‘Quake Prediction Panics Area’s Inhabitants, 
23/12/1947. 
Ōmori, Fusakichi. 1906. Tokyo to daijishin no fusetsu [The Groundless Rumor of a 
Great Tokyo Earthquake]. Taiyō 12 (4): 173-6. 
Sassa Kenzō. 1947. Kinki jishin wa itsu kuru ka [When Will the Kinki Earthquake 
Occur?]. Kyoto: Miyako shinbun. 
Shimamura, Hideki. 2004. Kōnin “Jishin Yochi” O Utagau [Questioning Official 
“Earthquake Prediction”]. Tokyo: Kashiwa shobo. 
Shimamura, Hideki. 2008. Jishin Yochi Wa Usodarake [Earthquake Prediction is a 
Bunch of Lies]. Tokyo: Kōdansha. 
Usami, Tatsuo. 1982. Great Earthquakes of the Past. In Earthquake Prediction 
Techniques: Their Application in Japan, ed. Toshi Asada, 11-29. Tokyo: Tokyo 
University Press. 
Wadati, Kiyoo. 1947. Daijishin ga kuru to iu hanashi [Talk of an Imminent Earth-
quake]. Yomiuri shinbun, 15/12/1947. 
Wood, Harry O., and Beno Gutenberg. 1935. Earthquake Prediction. Science 82 
(2123): 219-20. 
Yamashita, Fumio. 2009. Kakusareta Daishinsai: Taiheiyō Sensō Shi Hiroku [The 
Hidden Great Earthquake Disaster: Secret Records of the History of the Pacific 
War]. Sendai-shi: Tōhoku Daigaku Shuppankai. 
Yomiuri shinbun. 1947. Yōjin wa kekkō da ga, sawagu no ataranu [Taking precau-
tions is fine, but there is no need to be alarmed], 12/10/1947. 
